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Autonomous Vehicles Will Drive 
Themselves – But They Won’t Regulate 
Themselves 
 
David Goldstein* 
 
I.  INTRODUCTION TO AUTONOMOUS VEHICLES 
 
The dawn of a new era of transportation is upon us.  Cars that drive 
themselves are no longer relegated to our imaginations and science-fiction 
movies.  Automobile companies like Tesla and Volvo, as well as search-
engine giant Google, are rolling out new features that take over the duties 
previously charged to the driver of a vehicle.1  Since October 2014, all of 
Tesla’s vehicles come standard with hardware for their Autopilot feature.2  
Tesla’s Autopilot feature, which requires an up-charge of $2,500 for 
activation,3 includes capabilities such as blind spot warnings, automatic 
braking, and lane switching.4  A further update to the Autopilot software 
added a capability that Tesla refers to as “Summon,” which, when 
activated, will induce the car to exit a parking space on its own, without a 
driver inside the car, and approach its nearby owner,5 like a personal, built-
in valet. 
Tesla’s Autopilot feature also possesses the ability to do the driving 
for its passengers.6  The operator of a Tesla can allow the car to take over 
the driving at speeds above 18 miles per hour.7  This technology was 
recently used by a group of three on a cross-country trip from New York 
City to Redondo Beach, California, that took just under a mere fifty-eight 
 
 *  J.D. Candidate, University of California, Hastings College of the Law, 2017.  I would like to 
thank the HBLJ team for selecting my note and working with me throughout the editing process.  I 
would also like to give a special thanks to my parents for their wisdom and continued support.   
 1. Markos Moulitsas, Whether It’s Faraday, Tesla, or Volvo, Our Electric Self-Driving Car 
Future Is Closer Than Ever, DAILY KOS (Jan. 6, 2016, 12:02 PM PST), http://www.daily kos.com/ 
story/2016/1/6/1466657/-Whether-it-s-Faraday-Tesla-or-Volvo-our-electric-self-driving-car-future-is-
closer-than-ever. 
 2. Cadie Thompson, 7 Incredible Things Tesla’s Cars Can Now Do on Autopilot, TECH INSIDER 
(Jan. 11, 2016, 2:24 PM), http://www.techinsider.io/7-incredible-tesla-autopilot-features-2016-1. 
 3. Id. 
 4. Id. 
 5. Id. 
 6. Alex Davies, Obviously Drivers Are Already Abusing Tesla’s Autopilot, WIRED (Oct. 22, 2015, 
7:00 AM), http://www.wired.com/2015/10/obviously-drivers-are-already-abusing-teslas-autopilot/. 
 7. Id. 
3 - GOLDSTEIN MACROS.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 5/5/2017  11:10 AM 
242 HASTINGS BUSINESS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 13:2 
hours.8  Autopilot was engaged during ninety-six percent of the trip.9  
Despite the car’s ability to stay in the lanes on its own, the driver must 
touch the steering wheel every few seconds or else the car will signal a 
warning and eventually come to a controlled stop.10  Tesla CEO Elon Musk 
has stated, “[w]e tell drivers to keep their hands on the wheel just in case, 
to exercise caution in the beginning.”11 
Although Tesla’s current stance is to implore drivers to stay relatively 
alert while using Autopilot, undoubtedly, it will not be long before driver 
attention is not required at all.  In fact, Google is developing a line of self-
driving cars that does not even permit its human passengers to drive.12  The 
electrically-powered vehicle contains no steering wheel and no brake 
pedals.13  The only control that a passenger possesses in Google’s 
revolutionary vehicle is a red emergency stop button.14 
Tesla’s Model S, the company’s cheapest currently available model, 
starts at $75,000 before tax-incentives15 (the federal government and many 
state governments give tax credits to buyers of low-emission vehicles16), so 
by no means are its Autopilot features widely available to the public.  
However, on March 31, 2016, Tesla unveiled its Model 3.17  Like Tesla’s 
other vehicles, the Model 3 comes standard with Autopilot hardware.18  
Starting at $35,000 before tax incentives,19 the Model 3 is being billed as 
Tesla’s mass-market car.20  Within twenty-four hours of the Model 3’s 
unveiling, Tesla already had 232,000 preorders for the car (most having 
come in prior to the unveiling).21  Though the Model 3 is not slated for 
production until late 2017,22 it is clear that cars with autonomous driving 
 
 8. Davies, supra note 6. 
 9. Id. 
 10. Id. 
 11. Id. 
 12. John Markoff, Google’s Next Phase in Driverless Cars: No Steering Wheel or Brake Pedals, 
N.Y. TIMES (May 27, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/05/28/technology/googles-next-phase-in-
driverless-cars-no-brakes-or-steering-wheel.html. 
 13. Id. 
 14. Id. 
 15. TESLA, https://www.teslamotors.com/models/design?source=models-features1 (last visited 
Apr. 5, 2016). 
 16. PLUG IN AMERICA, http://www.pluginamerica.org/incentives (last visited Apr. 5, 2016). 
 17. Jordan Golson, Tesla Model 3 Announced: Release Set for 2017, Price Starts at $35,000, THE 
VERGE (Mar. 31, 2016, 11:58 PM), http://www.theverge.com/2016/3/31/11335272/tesla-model-3-anno 
unced-price-release-date-specs-preorder. 
 18. Id. 
 19. Id. 
 20. Dana Hull, Musk Unveils Tesla’s $35,000 Model 3 in Push for Mass Market, BLOOMBERG 
(Mar. 31, 2016, 9:22 PM PST), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2016-04-01/musk-unveils-
tesla-s-35-000-model-3-in-push-for-mass-market. 
 21. Richard Lawler, Tesla’s Model 3 has already racked up 232,000 pre-orders, ENGADGET (Apr. 
1, 2016), http://www.engadget.com/2016/04/01/teslas-model-3-has-already-racked-up-232-000-pre-orders/. 
 22. Golson, supra note 17. 
3 - GOLDSTEIN MACROS.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 5/5/2017  11:10 AM 
Winter 2017] AUTONOMOUS VEHICLES 243 
capabilities are coming fast and will be here to stay. 
While some may bemoan the coming of a Terminator-esque world 
ruled by computers, taking organic life forms out of the driving equation 
will actually benefit modern-day society in ways probably unimaginable a 
generation ago.  The first benefit of a life where cars drive themselves that 
may come to mind for American workers is the ability to kick back and 
read the news during the morning commute, to recline the “driver’s” seat 
on the way home to steal a few minutes of shut eye.  Undoubtedly, that 
scenario sounds appealing to practically anyone who drives to work or who 
has been stuck in a traffic jam. 
One of the greatest benefits autonomous vehicles (“AVs”) will bestow 
upon us, however, is their safety.  Roughly 33,000 people die in traffic 
accidents every year in the United States.23  From the time that Google 
started its AV program in 2009 until July 2015, the tech giant’s intelligent 
four-wheelers logged 1.2 million hours on the road.24  During that period of 
time, Google’s AVs were involved in only fourteen accidents.25  All 
fourteen of those accidents were caused by human error — not flaws in the 
technology.26 
Beyond safety, cars that can drive themselves and that also 
communicate with other vehicles on the road will increase our traffic 
efficiency.  Connected and automated driving technologies will allow 
vehicles to drive closer to each other without sacrificing safety.27  This will 
increase roadway capacity due to the reduction of wasted space between 
vehicles.28  Furthermore, these technologies will reduce the need for space-
consuming safety barriers and roadway signs, thus increasing efficiency 
and aesthetics.29 
Notwithstanding the various benefits to convenience, safety, and 
efficiency that AVs will bestow upon us, there are many people in various 
industries who are sweating this impending driving revolution.  As AVs 
reduce the number and severity of automobile accidents, they will 
moreover reduce the need for automobile insurance coverage.30  In fifteen 
 
 23. Jemima Kiss, Self-Driving Cars: Safe, Reliable – But A Challenging Sell for Google, THE 
GUARDIAN (Oct. 6, 2015), http://www.theguardian.com/technology/2015/oct/06/google-self-driving-
car-jemima-kiss. 
 24. Id. 
 25. Id. 
 26. Id. 
 27. John McCarthy et al., Connected & Autonomous Vehicles: Introducing the Future of Mobility 
6, ATKINS, http://www.atkinsglobal.com/~/media/Files/A/Atkins-Corporate/uk-and-europe/uk-thoug 
ht-leadership/reports/CAV_A4_digital_250915_FINAL.pdf.  
 28. Id. 
 29. Id. 
 30. Noah Buhayar & Peter Robison, Can the Insurance Industry Survive Driverless Cars?, 
BLOOMBERG BUSINESSWEEK (July 30, 2015, 2:00 AM PDT), http://www.bloomberg.com/ news/ 
articles/2015-07-30/can-the-insurance-industry-survive-driverless-cars-. 
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years, insurance premiums could drop by as much as sixty percent.31  As 
the car insurance industry collected roughly $195 billion in premiums in 
2014 from drivers in the U.S.,32 AVs could cost the industry more than 
$100 billion per year. 
The implications to the insurance industry of the widespread use of 
AVs go even further than this.  Volvo’s CEO, Håkan Samuelsson, has 
stated that his company will accept full liability when their cars are used in 
autonomous mode.33  Whether all producers of AVs will take this same 
stance is unclear at this time.  But if future changes in automobile 
regulation allow for car companies to provide insurance coverage en masse 
for the drivers of their cars, the insurance companies will very likely be at a 
great disadvantage at the negotiation table relative to their position today 
when dealing with individual policy holders. 
AV producers are also concerned about the current lack of regulation 
of AVs in the United States.34  Samuelsson has urged regulators to work 
with automakers in order to solve controversial legal issues surrounding 
AVs, including that of liability.35  He has stated that “[t]he U.S. risks losing 
its leading position due to the lack of federal guidelines for the testing and 
certification of autonomous vehicles.”36  But, as the numerous state and 
local governments are generally in charge of regulating driver behavior on 
public streets,37 there is not a uniform set of rules to play by. 
Given the uncertain nature of future legal liability and regulation of 
AVs, it is imperative that we establish a liability and regulatory framework 
so that automakers can continue to make advances in the field and 
consumers can know what to expect when operating their vehicles. 
Accordingly, this Note will discuss various options for future AV liability 
and regulatory challenges, and ultimately will outline a recommendation 
that will involve coordination between the federal and state governments, 
as well as private legal organizations. 
Working in concert, the National Highway Traffic Safety 
Administration (“NHTSA”), the states, and a new, AV-specific 
independent legal committee similar to the Permanent Editorial Board 
(“PEB”) for the Uniform Commercial Code (“UCC”) should regulate AVs 
through the introduction of NHTSA-required monitoring hardware and 
broad state adoption of a UCC-like common set of AV regulations which 
 
 31. Id. 
 32. Id. 
 33. Kirsten Korosec, Volvo CEO: We Will Accept All Liability When Our Cars Are in Autonomous 
Mode, FORTUNE (Oct. 7, 2015, 3:34 PM EDT), http://fortune.com/2015/10/07/volvo-liability-self-
driving-cars/. 
 34. Id. 
 35. Id. 
 36. Id. 
 37. Stephen P. Wood et al., The Potential Regulatory Challenges of Increasingly Autonomous 
Motor Vehicles, 52 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 1423, 1498 (2012). 
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would impute absolute liability on automakers for accidents and violations 
caused by their autonomous technology. 
 
II. LIABILITY ISSUES AND REGULATORY OBSTACLES 
 
A. HOW DO AVS WORK? 
 
AVs rely on a symphony of technologies in order to drive themselves.  
Google’s driverless cars have eight sensors.38  One of those sensors is 
called a Lidar, which is a camera that uses an array of either thirty-two or 
sixty-four lasers to measure the distance to objects in order to create a 
three-dimensional map at a range of 200 meters, allowing the car to detect 
hazards.39  Radars mounted to the bumpers keep track of vehicles in front 
of and behind the car.40  An ultrasonic sensor on one of the rear wheels 
monitors the car’s movements.41  The vehicle receives GPS information 
from a satellite but also contains altimeters, gyroscopes, and a tachometer 
for more precise measurements of its location.42 
The information gathered by the various sensors is then interpreted by 
the vehicle’s software, which can accurately identify other road users and 
their behavior patterns, as well as commonly used highway signals.43  
While certain behaviors are hard-coded into the car, such as stopping at red 
lights, other behaviors are learned based on previous driving experiences.44  
Google’s AV learning algorithm processes the data of all of their AVs in 
order to find an appropriate response to each possible problem.45  The AVs 
understand, for instance, that another driver’s likelihood to pass a slow-
moving vehicle in the right lane means that a car following behind it is 
more likely to attempt a pass; or, a pot hole in the street indicates a higher 
probability that a driver will swerve to avoid it.46  Furthermore, Google’s 
AVs don’t just use Google Maps for navigation — the AVs utilize maps 
that are detailed down to the height of the curbs and the dimensions of the 
lanes.47  Despite all of the impressive technology, the cars still have 
problems dealing with snow, ice, and heavy rain.48  However, in years to 
 
 38. Paul Hood, How Do Google’s Self-Driving Cars Work?, ALPHR (Apr. 4 2016), http://www. 
alphr.com/cars/7038/how-do-googles-self-driving-cars-work. 
 39. Id. 
 40. Id. 
 41. Id. 
 42. Id. 
 43. Id. 
 44. Bryan Clark, How Self-Driving Cars Work: The Nuts and Bolts Behind Google’s Autonomous 
Car Program, MAKEUSEOF (Feb 21, 2015), http://www.makeuseof.com/tag/how-self-driving-cars-
work-the-nuts-and-bolts-behind-googles-autonomous-car-program/. 
 45. Id. 
 46. Clark, supra note 44. 
 47. Id. 
 48. Id. 
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come, once the technology has matured and the last major technological 
hurdles have been overcome, “autonomous vehicle” is sure to become 
synonymous with “automobile.” 
 
B. WHO SHOULD BE LIABLE FOR ACCIDENTS CAUSED BY AVS? 
 
1. The Current Tort Law Framework of Liability 
 
The current framework for automobile liability in the U.S. is 
predicated, generally, on the principles of tort law and insurance law.  
When a person commits an unintentional tort by accidentally crashing a car 
into someone else’s car, the standard of negligence determines liability.49  
To win on a claim for negligence, a plaintiff must first establish that the 
defendant owed the plaintiff a duty.50  Next, the plaintiff must demonstrate 
that the defendant breached that duty.51  After that, the plaintiff must prove 
that the defendant’s actions that constituted the breach were the proximate 
cause of the plaintiff’s injury.52  Finally, the plaintiff must establish that she 
did, indeed, incur damages.53 
A typical automobile insurance contract contains coverage for various 
different occurrences.54  Some of these various types of coverage are “first-
party” coverage, meaning that they give the insured a claim directly against 
her insurer.55  Some of the “first-party” types of coverage are: 
comprehensive (for damage not caused by a collision, like falling objects 
and theft), collision, medical payments, and uninsured or underinsured 
motorists (referring to third parties).56  The insurance contracts also provide 
that the insurance company will defend claims by third parties seeking 
liability against the policyholder and will settle those claims when it sees 
fit.57 
While the tandem of tort law and individual automobile insurance 
policies work well for conventional cars with human drivers, they do not 
work very well when it comes to AVs, for reasons relating to both law and 
policy.  First, if the operator of an AV activates her car’s autonomous 
driving feature and sets her destination with a few taps of a touch-screen, 
then sits back and allows the car to drive itself, can she be deemed to have 
 
 49. W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS 161–64 (W. Page 
Keeton ed., 5th ed. 1984).  
 50. Id. at 164. 
 51. Id. 
 52. Id. at 165. 
 53. Id. 
 54. Robert W. Peterson, New Technology-Old Law: Autonomous Vehicles and California’s 
Insurance Framework, 52 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 1341, 1352 (2012). 
 55. Id. 
 56. Id. 
 57. Peterson, supra note 54, at 1353. 
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breached her duty of care to the other motorists if the AV makes a mistake 
and crashes into another car?  Courts in many states today might say “yes,” 
as most, if not all, states without AV legislation have reckless driving laws 
that require drivers to pay attention to the road.  However, if states continue 
to require “drivers” to pay attention to the road while their cars are in 
autonomous mode, the very crux of the benefit of AVs is totally eliminated. 
Inevitably, with further advancement of AV technology, the states will 
permit “drivers” to completely detach from the actual driving of the vehicle 
and allow the AV to take over altogether.  But at that point, if the current 
framework of tort law still governs, many consumers will certainly be 
apprehensive about AV technology.  After all, why should the operator of 
an AV be liable for a mistake that the AV makes?  Beyond that, if the states 
do allow for the operator of an AV to stop paying attention to the road, then 
can it be proven in court that the operator breached her duty if the AV 
causes an injury?  Could the operator’s actions be deemed the proximate 
cause of an injury when the operator was not actually required to do 
anything?  Additionally, some AV manufacturers have already stated that 
they want to take liability for the mistakes that their AVs make58 — so, 
why not give it to them? 
 
2. Products Liability 
 
Products liability law might seem a natural fit to succeed the current 
unintentional tort framework as the governing doctrine for automobile 
accidents in an era when AVs are the norm.  AVs are, in fact, products and 
when they cause automobile accidents, they likely have some technological 
defect, whether it is in the code making up the software element of the 
technology or a physical component of its hardware.  Products liability 
would also impute liability upon the manufacturer of the vehicle, rather 
than the operator of the vehicle.  Furthermore, there is already a wealth of 
precedent for using products liability law to find an automaker liable for 
defects in automobiles that malfunction and cause injury. 
In general, a defendant can be found liable under products liability 
doctrine for injury caused to a plaintiff by the defendant’s product if, at the 
time of sale or distribution, the product had a defect that falls into one of 
three categories.59  In the first category, a product contains a manufacturing 
defect when the product departs from its intended design.60  For instance, if 
a particular airplane requires a wingspan of fifty feet in order to fly safely, 
and the blueprints for the airplane specified a wingspan of fifty feet, but a 
flawed manufacturing process led to the airplane having a forty-nine-foot 
 
 58. Korosec, supra note 33. 
 59. See generally, RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PROD. LIAB. § 2 (AM. LAW INST. 1998). 
 60. Id. at § 2(a). 
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wingspan, that airplane has a manufacturing defect. 
In the second category, a product contains a design defect when the 
foreseeable risks of harm posed by the product could have been reduced or 
avoided by the adoption of a reasonable alternative design, and the design 
that was actually used renders the product not reasonably safe.61  Using the 
airplane example again, if a particular airplane requires a fifty-foot 
wingspan in order to fly safely, but the blueprints for the airplane specify a 
forty-nine-foot wingspan, the airplane built to the specifications laid out in 
the blueprints has a design defect. 
Finally, in the third category, a product has an inadequate warning 
defect if the product lacks instructions or warnings when the foreseeable 
risks of harm posed by the product could have been reduced or avoided by 
the provision of reasonable instructions or warnings, and without the 
warning the product is not reasonably safe.62  Thus, if it is unsafe to operate 
a particular single-seat airplane if the pilot weighs more than 400 pounds, 
but the airplane comes with no warning to that effect, that airplane has a 
warning defect. 
After making a finding of product defect, courts across the country 
have used both the negligence standard and the standard of strict liability as 
theories of recovery.63  While negligence focuses on the conduct of the 
manufacturer, strict liability focuses on the product.64  Strict liability’s 
product-focus may help make the point to a jury that the defendant is held 
to an expert standard of knowledge for the given industry65 (rather than to a 
standard of what was reasonable for that manufacturer to do) and, 
therefore, may be considered more consumer friendly. 
Regardless of whether the negligence standard or the strict liability 
standard is applied, however, a plaintiff must prove that a product is 
defective in order to recover under products liability law — a burden, 
likely, too great on a plaintiff for the purpose of determining liability for a 
minor car accident.  Products liability lawsuits are typically expensive and 
complex.66 
Imagine, for instance, that an AV causes an accident and a few 
thousand dollars’ worth of damage due to a minor flaw in the car’s 
software code, and after thorough investigation, it is found that there is 
nothing wrong with any of the physical aspects of the vehicle (cameras and 
sensors that the AV technology relies on, as well as the more conventional 
car parts).  Most likely, the plaintiff’s only option would be to sue the car 
company under the design defect theory of products liability, asserting that 
 
 61. Id. at § 2(b). 
 62. Id. at § 2(c). 
 63. Id. at § 1 cmt. a. 
 64. Id. 
 65. RESTATEMENT, supra note 59, at § 1 cmt. a. 
 66. Peterson, supra note 54, at 1355. 
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the software is dysfunctional.  This would require the plaintiff to locate and 
prove a flaw in the code of the software, a task that would be extremely 
costly and would likely outweigh the benefit of pursuing the suit by several 
orders of magnitude, if even possible.  Though products liability law has its 
place in the automobile liability world, it is not the right doctrine to govern 
everyday fender benders. 
 
3. Absolute Liability When at Fault 
 
If the current tort framework does not work for accidents caused by 
AVs because the operator of the vehicle does not actually drive, and 
products liability law does not make sense due to complexity and economic 
burden of litigation, then absolute liability imputed upon the automaker for 
accidents caused by AVs might be the best option.  The idea of 
transitioning from driver tort liability to automaker absolute liability may 
seem akin to a legal seismic shift.  Though the suggestion may raise some 
eyebrows, there is actually some precedent for the move. 
The Federal Safety Appliance Act (“FSAA”) requires railroads to 
maintain certain railroad equipment to a level consistent with prescribed 
conditions.67  The FSAA imposes absolute liability upon a railroad for 
injuries sustained by an employee when the automatic couplers (the devices 
that hold the train cars together) fail to perform properly.68  Therefore, in 
personal injury claims introduced for injuries caused by a violation of the 
FSAA, care on the part of the railroad is, generally, immaterial.69  
However, if the plaintiff’s negligence was the sole cause of the injury, then 
the statutory violation could not have contributed even in part to the injury, 
and absolute liability will not attach.70  Thus, when a railway employee is 
hurt when the automatic couplers fail to perform correctly, the railroad 
company will be liable for the employee’s damages no matter how much 
care the company took, as long as it cannot be proven that the employee’s 
injury stemmed one hundred percent from her own negligence. 
Though the situations are not perfectly analogous, this railroad model 
of absolute liability for automatic coupler failures might make the most 
sense when it comes to attributing liability when AVs fail to perform 
safely.  Absolute liability places the liability where it should be — on the 
maker of the technology — while not requiring a finding of a product 
defect.  Of course, absolute liability would only attach when it is found that 
the AV was at fault for the accident. 
Most frustrating to the adoption of a new framework for automobile 
 
 67. Magelky v. BNSF Ry. Co., 491 F. Supp. 2d 882, 888 (D.N.D. 2007). 
 68. Id. at 890. 
 69. Id. at 888–89. 
 70. Magelky, 491 F. Supp. 2d at 889 (internal citations omitted). 
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accidents, however, is not locating the most appropriate doctrine of law but 
rather finding a way to institute that doctrine uniformly across the many 
states and localities that comprise this country, so that all producers of AVs 
and all consumers of those vehicles can play by the same set of rules 
regardless of their area codes. 
 
C. THE PROBLEM WITH PATCHWORK STATE REGULATION 
 
Florida, California, Nevada, and Michigan were the first four states to 
pass AV legislation.71  In 2015, North Dakota and Tennessee joined their 
ranks, and several other states have introduced new bills this year.72  
Washington, D.C. has also passed AV laws.73  While the adoption of AV 
legislation by these states and the nation’s capital, representing more than 
twenty-four percent of the licensed drivers in the United States,74 is 
encouraging for the AV industry, the patchwork approach leaves much to 
be desired. 
While the many states may have slightly different definitions of the 
duty of care that an operator of a vehicle must maintain, it is not important 
for a driver to understand the subtle differences when driving across state 
lines.  After all, most drivers are going to exercise a degree of care, in the 
interest of their own safety, that will satisfy the local requirements.  The 
differences, and absences, in state laws regarding AVs, however, pose a 
major dilemma. 
Washington, D.C.’s AV legislation defines an AV as “a vehicle 
capable of navigating District roadways and interpreting traffic-control 
devices without a driver actively operating any of the vehicle’s control 
systems.”75  The law further provides that AVs may be operated on public 
roadways under three conditions.76  The first condition is that the vehicle 
has a manual override that allows the operator of the vehicle to assume 
control of the AV at any time.77  Second, the operator must be seated in the 
control seat of the AV while in operation and must be prepared to take 
control of the AV at any moment.78  Finally, the AV must be capable of 
operating in compliance with Washington, D.C.’s traffic and motor vehicle 
 
 71. John W. Terwilleger, Navigating The Road Ahead: Florida’s Autonomous Vehicle Statute and 
Its Effect on Liability, 89 FLA. B.J. 26, 27 (2015). 
 72. Autonomous/Self-Driving Vehicles Legislation, NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF STATE 
LEGISLATURES, http://www.ncsl.org/research/transportation/autonomous-vehicles-legislation.aspx (last 
visited Apr. 5, 2016). 
 73. Id. 
 74. STATISTA, Total Number of U.S. Licensed Drivers By State, http://www.statista.com/statis 
tics/198029/total-number-of-us-licensed-drivers-by-state/ (last visited Apr. 5, 2016). 
 75. D.C. CODE § 50-2351(1) (2013). 
 76. See generally, D.C. CODE § 50-2352 (2013). 
 77. D.C. CODE § 50-2352 (1) (2013). 
 78. D.C. CODE § 50-2352 (2) (2013). 
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laws as well as its traffic control devices (e.g., stop lights).79 
Meanwhile, a bill passed in Nevada generally banning the use of a cell 
phone for texting while operating a motor vehicle, explicitly excepts 
operators of “motor vehicle[s] driven autonomously through the use of 
artificial-intelligence software and [when] the autonomous operation of the 
motor vehicle is authorized by law.”80  Would an AV operator composing a 
text message on her phone be deemed “prepared to take control of the 
autonomous vehicle at any moment” under the D.C. law?  If, hypothetically 
speaking, Virginia passed a law that allows operators of AVs to do 
anything they want, including sleep, while their AV drives itself, a person 
taking a nap while travelling from Virginia to D.C. in her AV would need 
to make sure to wake up before crossing the state line in order to avoid 
violating D.C. law. 
Once AVs are the norm, the discrepancies amongst state laws could 
create a logistical nightmare not only for regular people travelling across 
state lines, but for the trucking industry which is likely to fully embrace 
AV technology.  Daimler AG, the corporation that owns Mercedes-Benz, is 
already developing an autonomous driving eighteen-wheeler.81  In 2012, 
nearly 4,000 people were killed in accidents with large trucks, most of 
them in passenger cars.82  Driver error caused about ninety percent of those 
deaths.83  Taking over-worked truck drivers out of the truck-driving 
equation will benefit road safety, but will also be good for trucking 
companies’ bottom lines.  The benefits might not be fully realized, 
however, if trucking companies cannot use AVs for long hauls due to the 
various, disparate requirements for their use in each state. 
 
D. FEDERAL REGULATION 
 
Though the federal government cannot compel the states to adopt 
uniform AV legislation, it can help to bridge some of the gaps.  The 
National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (“NHTSA”) was 
established by the Highway Safety Act of 1970.84  The NHTSA is an 
agency of the U.S. Department of Transportation85 and should play a 
critical role in the establishment of AV standards. 
In 1966, Congress enacted the National Traffic and Motor Vehicle 
 
 79. D.C. CODE § 50-2352 (3) (2013). 
 80. NEV. REV. STAT. § 484B.165(7) (2015). 
 81. Alex Davies, The World’s First Self-Driving Semi-Truck Hits the Road, WIRED (May 5, 2015, 
7:41 PM), http://www.wired.com/2015/05/worlds-first-self-driving-semi-truck-hits-road/. 
 82. Id. 
 83. Id. 
 84. NATIONAL HIGHWAY TRAFFIC SAFETY ADMINISTRATION, http://www.nhtsa.gov/About (last 
visited Apr. 5, 2016). 
 85. Id. 
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Safety Act.86  The amended act is currently codified as 49 U.S.C. §§ 30101 
et seq., and its stated purpose is “to reduce traffic accidents and deaths and 
injuries resulting from traffic accidents.”87  Section 30101 vests in the 
NHTSA authority to “prescribe motor vehicle safety standards for motor 
vehicles and motor vehicle equipment in interstate commerce”88 and “to 
carry out needed safety research and development.”89  So, the NHTSA can 
set performance standards to which manufacturers of motor vehicles and 
motor vehicle equipment must conform.90  The NHTSA does not regulate 
the actions of automobile owners nor how automobiles may be operated on 
public streets.91  Moreover, the NHTSA cannot require individual car 
owners to retrofit their cars with new equipment.92  The NHTSA has 
authority, however, to require manufacturers to install certain types of 
equipment on vehicles and to set performance standards for that 
equipment.93  One such example was when the NHTSA mandated and set 
standards for antilock brakes in air-braked vehicles.94 
Though only a decade or so ago it may have seemed like fantasy, it 
now seems inevitable that in coming years, the NHTSA may require cars to 
be built with AV technology.  Children born today may never get to 
experience driving a car.  Once the multitude of benefits of AV technology 
are realized, it is not out of the question that the NHTSA may ban the 
installation of human-operated instruments in cars. 
In January of this year, U.S. Transportation Secretary Anthony Foxx 
revealed that the Obama Administration intends to invest nearly $4 billion 
over ten years to accelerate the development and adoption of safe vehicle 
automation.95  The investment would fund pilot programs to test vehicle 
systems and work with industry leaders to encourage a multistate 
framework for AVs and connected vehicles.96  AV manufacturers were 
undoubtedly pleased to hear Secretary Foxx’s announcement, as it is a clear 
indication that the federal government is interested in advancing the 
development and regulation of AVs.  However, the federal government is 
limited in its ability to influence policy in the states, and the country is still 
far from a comprehensive plan for the regulation of AVs. 
 
 86. Wood et al., supra note 37, at 1434. 
 87. See generally, 49 U.S.C. § 30101 (1994). 
 88. 49 U.S.C. § 30101(1) (1994). 
 89. 49 U.S.C. § 30101(2) (1994). 
 90. Wood et al., supra note 37, at 1435. 
 91. Id. 
 92. Id. at 1436. 
 93. Id. at 1450. 
 94. Washington v. Dept. of Transp., 84 F.3d 1222, 1223 (10th Cir. 1996). 
 95. Press Release, National Highway Traffic Safety Administration, Secretary Foxx unveils 
President Obama’s FY17 Budget Proposal of Nearly $4 Billion for Automated Vehicles and Announces 
DOT Initiatives To Accelerate Vehicle Safety Innovations (Jan. 14, 2016), http://www.nhtsa.gov/About 
+NHTSA/Press+Releases/dot-initiatives-accelerating-vehicle-safety-innovations-01142016.  
 96. Id. 
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III. MY RECOMMENDATION 
 
A. PLAN OVERVIEW 
 
Creating a national framework for AVs by instituting regulations that 
provide for a uniform set of rules across the states regarding issues such as, 
but not limited to, liability when AVs cause accidents, is a great endeavor.  
The obstacles, as outlined above, are numerous.  A regulatory plan that 
works will, indubitably, require efforts by and coordination between the 
states, the federal government, and various independent entities.  
Accordingly, my plan will borrow from a previous successful joint-state 
endeavor, the UCC, in order to enact a policy of absolute liability, similar 
to that employed by the federal government in the FSAA, and will call 
upon the NHTSA for support in requiring new AVs to be outfitted with 
devices that will simplify the finding of fault when AVs cause accidents. 
 
B. BORROWING FROM THE UCC 
 
The UCC is a comprehensive modernization of various laws that 
govern commercial transactions.97  In 1944, the American Law Institute 
(“ALI”) and the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State 
Laws (“NCCUSL”) teamed up to work on the Commercial Code Project, 
which eventually became the UCC.98  An Editorial Board was created to 
coordinate the project, and that eventually evolved into the Permanent 
Editorial Board (“PEB”).99  The PEB now assists in attaining and 
maintaining uniformity in state statutes governing commercial 
transactions.100  It does this both by discouraging nonuniform amendments 
to the UCC by the states and by approving and promulgating amendments 
to the Code.101  The UCC has been adopted in 49 of the 50 states, as well as 
Washington, D.C. and the Virgin Islands.102 
Following this model, the ALI, NCCUSL, or a new, independent body 
of legal minds from the AV industry with representatives from all or many 
of the states and the major AV producers, should form an editorial board 
and draft a proposed uniform AV code intended for adoption by all fifty of 
 
 97. Uniform Commercial Code UCC, AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, https://www.ali.org/publica 
tions/show/uniform-commercial-code/ (last visited Apr. 5, 2016). 
 98. Permanent Editorial Board For The Uniform Commercial Code, Agreement Describing the 
Relationship of The American Law Institute, the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform 
State Laws, and the Permanent Editorial Board with Respect to the Uniform Commercial Code, 
https://www.ali.org/media/filer_public/54/d2/54d2249e-61df-4c33-bba7-b539bf8a5b99/agreement-peb-
ucc.pdf.  
 99. Id. 
 100. Id. 
 101. Id. 
 102. Id. 
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the United States and Washington D.C.  The editorial board’s main goal 
after drafting the legislation will be to encourage the states to adopt the 
law.  Then, from time to time, the editorial board can make amendments to 
the uniform AV code in order to keep it abreast of changing circumstances 
and new technology, as the PEB does for the UCC.  The editorial board 
will also be responsible for helping to maintain uniformity among the states 
by discouraging amendments contrary to the uniform AV code.  Finally, 
the editorial board will be the voice for the AV industry when it comes to 
communicating with the NHTSA to encourage or discourage changes to 
federally required safety standards and technology. 
 
C. LIABILITY 
 
The editorial board will have a lot of information and options to parse 
through when developing the uniform AV code, most of which is outside 
the scope of this discussion.  However, in terms of liability when AVs 
cause accidents, the uniform AV code should impute automakers with 
absolute liability.  Absolute liability for the manufacturer when an AV 
causes an accident makes more sense than a products liability approach or 
the current approach used in most automobile accidents. 
The current framework imputes the operator of a vehicle with tort 
liability when that vehicle is the cause of an accident.  This makes sense 
because the operator of the vehicle is responsible for controlling all of the 
vehicles movements.  That is not true, however, for AVs.  At the point 
when AV technology is good enough so that operators of vehicles no 
longer need to be aware of what is happening on the road, it is illogical to 
use the standard of negligence to determine liability.  Also, a number of 
automakers have stated that they want to take legal responsibility for the 
mistakes that their AVs make, undoubtedly because that will be a necessary 
step for consumers to have confidence in those products.  Thus, it is crucial 
that we move away from the current framework. 
Products liability doctrine, though seemingly suited for this purpose, is 
overly costly and complex for the majority of automobile accidents.  
Proving a product defect is far too great of a burden for an automobile 
accident plaintiff seeking to recover several thousand dollars for an 
accident, especially when an accident caused by an AV is due to flaws in 
the car’s software rather than its physical components. 
AV manufacturers, of course, will not be liable for any and all damage 
done by or to an AV, but only when it is established that the AV was at 
fault.  Though the operator of the AV may no longer be part of the 
question, methods of determining fault by the likes of police officers and 
insurance company representatives will go largely unchanged.  If an AV 
rear-ends another car at a stop sign, the AV is going to be at fault, just as a 
human would be if that human rear-ended another car with her car.  
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Additionally, determination of fault will be established more easily due to 
the development of new technology that can monitor AVs.  Absolute 
liability will expedite and simplify the litigation process, decreasing costs 
and increasing efficiency.  In addition, the uniform AV code should 
provide that any aftermarket modifications to an AV would create a 
rebuttable presumption against liability attaching to the automaker.  This 
would protect AV manufacturers from being liable for accidents arising 
from consumer interference with the technology. 
 
D. NHTSA-REQUIRED MONITORING DEVICE 
 
With uniform state regulations imputing absolute liability on 
manufacturers of AVs at fault for accidents, the last step of the plan falls to 
the responsibility of the federal government.  Several state governments 
already require AVs to have monitoring devices that will be used to store 
data surrounding accidents involving AVs.  California law requires that all 
AVs have a: 
. . . mechanism . . . to capture and store the autonomous 
technology sensor data for at least 30 seconds before a collision 
occurs between the autonomous vehicle and another vehicle, 
object, or natural person while the vehicle is operating in 
autonomous mode. The autonomous technology sensor data shall 
be captured and stored in a read-only format by the mechanism 
so that the data is retained until extracted from the mechanism by 
an external device capable of downloading and storing the data.  
The data shall be preserved for three years after the date of the 
collision.103 
 
This required sensor will be integral in determining fault for accidents and 
isolating the cause of the AV’s mistake, when applicable. 
The NHTSA should adopt language similar to this California law in 
requiring all new AVs to be built with monitoring devices.  The monitoring 
device would not only capture sensor data, but would also record inputs by 
the operator in order to help determine whether or not the operator of the 
vehicle, rather than the AV, was actually at fault.  Furthermore, the 
NHTSA should require that all AVs disable all operator input when 
operating in autonomous mode.  Autonomous mode could be turned off 
with the press of a button, but by disabling operator input while in 
autonomous mode, the monitor data will guarantee that the operator played 
no part in the AV’s autonomous mode mistakes, and thus absolute liability 
can be imputed upon the manufacturer without question.  The monitoring 
device would allow accident inspectors to know that the car was in fully 
 
 103. CAL. VEH. CODE § 38750(c)(1)(G) (West 2015). 
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autonomous mode and not receiving operator input. 
 
E. INSURANCE IMPLICATIONS 
 
Once automakers are absolutely liable for the accidents caused by 
their AVs, the burden of paying for insurance coverage will largely shift 
from the consumer to the manufacturer.  AV manufacturers will likely opt 
to purchase coverage in bulk for all of their AVs on the road.  While 
consumers will not need to pay for coverage for their vehicles for driving in 
autonomous mode, they will probably still want to take out relatively small 
policies for comprehensive and uninsured motorist coverage.  A consumer 
policy may also cover the unlikely scenario where an AV causes an 
accident but is not covered by the manufacturer because the manufacturer 
recently went out of business.  Of course, if a manufacturer of AVs does go 
out of business, owners of that company’s AVs will at some point be 
required to purchase collision coverage.  Consumers will always be 
required to take out coverage for collisions stemming from conventional 
operation of their vehicles, which may give further impetus to the idea of 
removing human-operated controls altogether.  Even if steering wheels 
remain in AVs, an autonomous mode that completely disables human 
control could end the requirement of consumer collision coverage. 
 
IV. CONCLUSION 
 
Regulation of AVs is extremely complicated because AVs are turning 
the century-old automobile industry on its head.  We can no longer rely on 
the law of the past and must advance at the pace of technology.  A 
coordinated effort between an independent editorial board charged with the 
responsibility of promulgating a uniform AV code (that imputes absolute 
liability on AV manufacturers when AVs cause accidents), the states 
adopting that code, and the NHTSA requiring monitoring devices and a 
fully-autonomous mode that disables human input will allow the AV 
industry to takeoff.  Once everybody is playing by the same set of rules, 
AV manufacturers will be able to focus on their products rather than the 
law, and the general public will know what to expect from those products.  
AVs have the potential to completely change our society and our way of 
life, but the technology is approaching faster than our laws are evolving.  In 
order for society to reap the full benefits of AVs as soon as possible, the 
laws regulating AVs need to be in the right place, which will take 
tremendous effort and cooperation by lawmakers and manufacturers alike.  
While in the near future we will rely on AVs to drive themselves, 
unfortunately, we cannot rely on AVs to regulate themselves today. 
 
